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Abstract: We analyse auctions when individuals have ambiguity over the joint infor-
mation structures generating the valuations and signals of players. We analyze how two
standard auction e¤ects interact with the ambiguity of bidders over correlation struc-
tures. First, a competition e¤ect arises when di¤erent beliefs about the correlation
between biddersvaluations imply di¤erent likelihoods of facing competitive bids. Sec-
ond, a winners value e¤ectarises when di¤erent beliefs imply di¤erent inferences about
the winners value. In the private values case, only the rst e¤ect exists and this implies
that the distribution of bids rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of bids
in the absence of ambiguity. In common value auctions both e¤ects exist and we show
that compared to the canonical model, both in the rst-price and second-price auctions,
these e¤ects combine to imply that the sellers revenue decreases with ambiguity (in con-
trast with the private values case). We then characterise the optimal auction in both the
private and common value cases. A novel feature that arises in the optimal mechanism
in the common values case is that the seller only partially insures the high type against
ambiguity.
1 Introduction
In auctions, as in many other strategic situations, individuals often have a good un-
derstanding of their own private information but they might know less about others
information sources. For example, in auctions for drilling rights, a company might un-
derstand the test results that it conducted but might be worried that these results might
be correlated with those of other rms. Similarly the evaluation one gets about a piece
of art on sale, might be correlated in complex ways to the evaluations othe bidders might
get.
1This project has received funding from the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under grant agreement No SEC-C413. We thank Subir Bose and Francesco Nava for helpful
comments.
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In these situations bidders might worry about their lack of understanding of the cor-
relation structure between their own information and that of other bidders.2 These con-
siderations are important for their bidding behaviour. In private value auctions, beliefs
about correlation inuence the assessment of bidders about the competition they might
face. In common value auctions, such beliefs also a¤ect the biddersvaluation of the good,
which implies an additional e¤ect on the biddersstrategies.
In this paper we analyze private and common value auctions when individuals have
ambiguity over the joint information structures generating valuations and signals. Specif-
ically, we assume that individuals know the marginal information structure generating a
value or a signal to each bidder, but that they are aware that their information sources
might be correlated to a degree, and face ambiguity over the possible correlation scenar-
ios. We propose a simple model to analyze ambiguity over correlation structures that
is tailored to the comparison with the standard model.3 In particular, we use a single
parameter, a; to bound the degree of pointwise mutual information of the information
structures.4 When an individual receives a signal and contemplates what strategy to
play, she faces ambiguity aversion (as in Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) about the set of
potential joint information structures, that are bounded by a; which govern the valuations
and signals of the two bidders.
We analyze a two-bidder, binary-value and binary signal auction (in Section 5 we extend
the analysis to models with continuous signals and with many bidders). In this model,
the set of information structures that the bidders considers is centered around the true
canonical case of independent values and signals, and takes the following form. Consider
the two bidders, 1 and 2, with values v =(v1; v2) each receiving a signal, s1 and s2 respec-
tively. Let q(sjv) denote a joint probability of the signal vector s = (s1; s2) conditional on
the valuations for the good; and q1(s1jv) and q2(s2jv) denote the marginal probabilities
of s1 and s2 conditional on v: Similarly, let p(v) denote the prior over v; with pi(vi) the









 a for some nite parameter a  1;
for any s;v:5 In other words, the (exponential) pointwise mutual information (ePMI) is
2Here we consider sophisticated individuals who entertain the possibility that such correlation might
exist. A recent literature looks at naive individuals who are not aware of the correlation between sources
of information, i.e., correlation neglect. See Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), Glaeser and Sunstein (2009)
and Levy and Razin (2015a, 2015b), Eyster and Weizsacker (2011), Kallir and Sonsino (2009) and Enke
and Zimmermann (2013).
3Auctions are typically analyzed under the assumption of conditionally-independent private informa-
tion, with the bidders aware of this fact.
4See Church and Hanks (1991).
5Levy and Razin (2018) show that this restriction provides a meaningful way to constrain the set of
ambiguous beliefs.
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bounded. The higher is a; the larger is the ambiguity. When a = 1 we are back in the
standard model with conditionally independent signals and no ambiguity. This framework
allows us to analyze ambiguity in the private value auction (where we focus on ambiguity
over p(v)); and in the common value auction (where we focus on ambiguity over q(sjv)):
In the model, ambiguity over information structures is exogenous but ambiguity over
the valuations or the equilibrium bids of opponents is endogenous, and depends on the
strategic interaction. An ambiguity averse bidder focuses attention on beliefs that min-
imise her expected utility. This will be reected in beliefs that either put weight on more
competition, believing the other bidders have similar valuations, or on a low value of the
good. The former e¤ect, the competition e¤ect, is present in both private and common
value auctions. The second e¤ect, a winners value e¤ectexists only in common value
auctions.
We analyze the equilibria in the second-price and rst-price auctions. We rst focus
on the competition e¤ect. We show how this e¤ect implies overbidding in the private
values case; the distribution of bids in the rst price auction in the face of ambiguity rst-
order stochastically dominates that in the standard model. This implies that ambiguity
is benecial for the seller as her revenue increases with a: In contrast, the winners value
e¤ectgenerally implies that bidders should shed their bids. We show that in common-
value auctions, in which both e¤ects are present, the winners value e¤ect is stronger
and the sellers revenue decreases in ambiguity. In particular, the low type always shed
their bids while the high type do so unless ambiguity is small and signals too imprecise.
In Section 5 we show that this result (and the intuition behind it) also holds when we
consider an environment with many bidders, as well as an environment with continuous
signals.
We then turn to consider optimal auction design in the face of ambiguity over correla-
tion structures. We rst show that the above results about the sellers revenue also hold
for the optimal auction; the sellers optimal revenue increases in ambiguity in the private
values case but decreases in the common value case. In the private values case our results
are consistent with Bose et al (2006) who show that the optimal mechanism fully insures
the bidders against ambiguity. In Bose et al (2006) bidders believe that valuations are
independently drawn, but face ambiguity regarding the particular distributions of valua-
tions that others have. In contrast, in our model bidders know the marginal distribution
of valuations but face ambiguity about the joint distribution of valuations. Still, the full
insurance result holds in our setting when values are private.
The full insurance result implies that the competition e¤ect does not arise in equilib-
rium in the optimal auction. However, there is a sense in which the seller exploits the
competition e¤ect to increase her revenue. Since under the worst case belief the high type
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believes that her opponent is likely to also be a high type, she is less willing to deviate
than when there is no ambiguity, and the seller is able to extract more rent from the high
type. Thus, the sellers revenue increases in ambiguity.
In the common value case, insuring the buyers against ambiguity is not necessarily
optimal. In the standard case without ambiguity, any optimal mechanism must allocate
the good with probability 1 and fully extract rent. However, any such mechanism cannot
be a full insurance mechanism. To prevent the high type from deviating, the seller has to
conduct side bets with the low type. Under ambiguity, these side bets are costly since the
expected payment to the seller is smaller under the sellers belief than under the worst
case belief of the buyer. However, if ambiguity is small or if the signals are very precise,
these side bets remain optimal and the low type is not insured against ambiguity.
Furthermore, even though there is no need to conduct side bets with the high type
to satisfy any incentive constraint, it is also not necessarily optimal to fully insure the
high type. This is because to fully insure the high type, the allocation rule needs to be
independent of the type of her opponent. Otherwise, the winners value e¤ect implies that
the high type will underestimate the value of the object. However, when the ambiguity
is small or the signals are precise, the seller will allocate the good to the high type with
higher probability when her opponent is a low type in order to slacken the incentive
constraint. In this case, the seller provides partial insurance by also asking the high type
to pay more when her opponent is low type. Under the worst case belief, the high type
does not care about the type of her opponent, but undervalues the object conditional on
winning. In other words, the seller insures the buyer against the competition e¤ect but
not the winners value e¤ect.
On the other hand if the signals are very imprecise and the ambiguity large, the seller
nds it optimal to fully insure the buyers against the ambiguity, so that the allocation
of the good does not depend on their signals. As a result, the high type earns positive
rents in equilibrium. Finally, we show that the sellers revenue in the optimal mechanism
is decreasing in the amount of ambiguity, as we found in both the rst and second price
auctions.
Our paper is related to a recent literature on ambiguity and auctions. As far as we
know, our paper is the rst to analyse ambiguity in common-value auctions. For private-
value auctions, Salo andWeber (1995) and Chen et al (2007) show how ambiguity aversion
translates to higher bids as individuals underestimate their winning probabilities.6 We
complement their analysis by dening ambiguity di¤erently, and more importantly, by
considering the common-values case and the comparison with the private-values case,
6Chen et al (2007) however provide experimental evidence that bids are lower in the presence of
ambiguity in rst and second-price auctions with independent private values.
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both positively and normatively. Bose et al (2006) analyze optimal auction mechanisms
for private-value auctions with ambiguity over other biddersvaluations. They show that
the seller will fully insure the buyers against ambiguity. Again, our key contribution is to
analyze the common-values case and compare it to the private-values case. Specically,
we show that in the common value auction sometimes only partial insurance arises. Lo
(1998) shows that the rst-price auction dominates the second-price auction in some
environments. He uses a multiple priors approach and shows that equilibrium bids are
simply determined as if all players hold the worst-case prior. In our analysis players with
di¤erent signals focus on di¤erent beliefs so the model is not equivalent to one in which
players start for example from a mis-specied model with wrong beliefs.
Bose and Renou (2014) study how principals can use ambiguous mechanisms to imple-
ment social welfare functions that are not attainable under unambiguous mechanisms. In
particular, they construct ambiguous communication mechanisms between the agents and
a moderator resulting with agents updating to sets of beliefs. Hanany et al (2018) is a
recent contribution to the study of incomplete information games and ambiguity. Finally,
Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2015) consider private values auctions and study the set
of achievable utilities when considering, as modelers, the set of di¤erent feasible informa-
tion structures. Our analysis is di¤erent as in our approach it is the economic agents,
rather than the modeler, who span the possible information structures. In addition, we
restrict the set of possible information structures using the notion of pointwise mutual
information. We show how this shifts equilibrium behaviour in a non-trivial way.
2 The Model
We consider a simple symmetric auction with two bidders (1 and 2), each with two possible
valuations v 2 fL;Hg where 0  L < H = 1. For expositional purposes we will focus on
the case of L = 0 in the body of the paper. Results are easily generalised to L > 0 (see
the Appendix where we also provide related results for the case of continuos valuations
and signals).
We will consider two cases, private values and common values. In the private value case
we will assume that valuations are independent across bidders and distributed uniformly.
In the common value case we will assume that the valuations are fully positively correlated
with a uniform prior. Bidders know if they are in the private or common values case.
The paper focuses on ambiguity over joint information structures. We model this am-
biguity by spanning a set of possible symmetric information structures around the true
information structures mentioned above for the private and common value cases. In par-
ticular, we assume that bidders know the following aspects of the environment:
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1. The state space. A state is a vector of valuations v = (v1; v2) 2 fL;Hg2.
2. Priors about the state. Each bidder knows that the marginal prior distributions are
uniform; that is, the probability that each bidder has a low value is a half.
3. Signals. Each bidder i = 1; 2 observes a private signal si 2 fl; hg:
Bidders entertain a set of possible joint information structures that are consistent with
the above three aspects of the environment. A joint information structure is given by
(fL;Hg2; fl; hg2; q(s;v);p(v)) where q(s;v) is a joint probability on fl; hg2  fL;Hg2
and p(v) a distribution over fL;Hg2 that is consistent with uniform marginals.
To dene the level of ambiguity, we use a simple one-parameter characterization for the
set of joint information structures introduced in Levy and Razin (2018). This characteri-
zation uses the exponent of the pointwise mutual information (ePMI) to dene bounds on
the correlation between information structures. Specically, for each bidder let qi(sijv)
denote the marginal conditional probability of receiving the private signal si 2 fl; hg given
state v and let pi(vi) denote the marginal prior. We assume the following:
Assumption A1: There is a parameter 1  a < 1; such that each bidder only
considers joint information structures, (fL;Hg2; fl; hg2; q(s;v); p(v)); so that at any state








The parameter a, the PMI-bound, describes the extent of the ambiguity a bidder faces
over the set of correlation scenarios. It is straightforward to see that ambiguity is larger
when a is larger. The formulation of the set is general in the sense that it is detail-free
in terms of the underlying distribution functions. It also captures the maximal set of
joint information structures with correlation bounded by a. Note that a joint information
structure which satises independence would have a = 1 at any point; whenever a joint
information structure does not satisfy independence then the ePMI is less than 1 for
some (s;v); and is greater than 1 for some (s0;v0).8 A higher a implies that bidders
consider information structures that are more concordant; for more on pointwise mutual
information as a measure of correlation see Levy and Razin (2018).
In Section 3 we will analyze rst-price and second-price auctions for the private values
and common values cases, while Section 4 will provide the optimal auction analysis. In all
7All the results can be easily generalized if instead of the lower bound 1a we use some nite b < 1.
8It is then impossible to consider only priors/information structures with ePMI that is only higher
(lower) than 1.
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these cases, an equilibrium is denoted by a pair of bidding strategies for the two players,
(b1(s1); b
2(s2)); and a symmetric equilibrium has b1(:) = b2(:)  b(:): We consider max-
min behaviour. Specically, in equilibrium, given an observed signal, a bidding strategy
maximizes the utility of the individual under the worst-case information structure.
Our framework is exible to consider di¤erent types of underlying correlations, which
will be tied to the private/common values environment (indeed in Section 5 we consider
environments with continuous signals and with many bidders). To complete the model,
we now specify the feasible information structures considered by bidders in these two
environments.
2.1 Private values
In the private values model bidders know their values (and know they are in the private
values model). As signals are fully informative about ones own value, ambiguity will
arise about the correlation in the prior distribution p(v). Specically, each prior distrib-
ution must be consistent with the uniform marginal prior distributions, so that the set of
functions p(v) for v 2f0; 1g are represented by:








Ambiguity is over the parameter  then. Given a; the ePMI constraints impose the
following restrictions on :
1
a




  )  a
It is easy to see that the higher is a; the larger is the set of possible information structures










In the common values case, the ambiguity of the bidders will a¤ect their perception about
the correlation between their signals and those of their opponents, through q(sjv). In the
previous case we had xed the marginal priors; here we x the marginal distributions of the
signals. In particular, there are two states of the world, v 2 f(1; 1); (0; 0)g: The probability
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of receiving the signal l in state v =(0; 0); or the signal h in state v =(1; 1); is q > 1
2
i.e.,
q(s = lj(0; 0)) = q(s = hj(1; 1)) = q:9 We assume that the true joint probability distrib-
ution, q(s1; s2jv); satises conditional independence, so that q(s1; s2jv) =
Q
i=1;2 qi(sijv).
However, while individuals know the true marginal probability distribution generating
both their signals, they have ambiguity over the set of joint information structures.
With the above specication, we can represent the family of information structures the
bidder entertain by:10
Table 2: joint information structures for the common value case
(0; 0) l h
l 0 q   0
h q   0 1  2q + 0
(1; 1) l h
l 1 1  q   1
h 1  q   1 2q   1 + 1
;
Under independence (a = 1), 0 = q2 and 1 = (1   q)2: In this case then, 0 and
1 are the parameters over which there is ambiguity, as we dene below. It is then easy
to derive the bounds for these parameters using the ePMI constraints. Specically, for a
general a, the ePMI constraints imply the following bounds on the values of the 0s:
0(a)  0  0(a)










8<:a(1  q)2 + 2q   1 a  q1 qq   1
a
q(1  q) a > q
1 q
; 1(a) =
8<:a(1  q)2 a  q1 q1  q   1
a
q(1  q) a > q
1 q
:
3 The competition and winners value e¤ects
We now show how ambiguity over correlation can a¤ect bids in two di¤erent ways. The
competition e¤ect arises as ambiguity will play a role in shaping beliefs about the probable
bids of the opponent. The winners value e¤ect will arise as ambiguity may play a role
in shaping beliefs about ones own valuation given the information held by the opponent.
Naturally, only the rst e¤ect will arise in the private values case while both will arise in
the common values case.
9The analysis can be extended to non-symmetric marginal probability distributions.
10The table describes an information structure so for each state, all cell entries are non-negative and
all entries sum up to one.
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3.1 Private-values
In the private value case, for each bidder i the signal si 2 fl; hg fully reveals her value.
Ambiguity will then play a role in shaping beliefs about the probable bids of the opponent
but not about the value of the good. Below we show that the competition e¤ect implies
higher bids. The results in this section are closely related to Salo and Weber (1995) and
Chen et al (2007) who analyze auctions with ambiguity about the distribution of values
in the case of private values. For concreteness, and in order to compare this environment
to that of common values, we replicate these results in our setting.
Consider the rst-price auction. When a = 1; this is the standard model and the unique
equilibrium has the low type submitting a bid of zero, and the high types mixing between
bids in [0; 1
2
] according to the distribution F (b) = b
1 b :When a > 1; the low type still bids
zero -her value- in equilibrium.
We now consider the high type, when a > 1. Let p be the belief of the high type of
bidder 1 that bidder 2 is a high type. From Table 1 we have that p = 2; and thus given
the ePMI constraints for the high type of bidder 1, given a mixed strategy F (:) of the
other player, the expected utility for some bid b is given by:
min
p=2; (a)(a)
Pr(Bidder 1 wins)(1  b) = min
p=2; (a)(a)
((1  p) + pF (b))(1  b)
From this expression we see that the expected utility depends on beliefs only through the
probability of winning. Moreover, it is easy to see that for any b; the unique minimizer
of utility is the highest p feasible; which is easily derived as p(a) = 2(a) = 1   1
2a
.
Let "(a)  p(a)   1
2
: We can then describe the strategy of the high type in the unique
equilibrium as mixing on the interval [0; 1
2




); according to the
distribution Fa(b) = 12a 1
b
1 b which stochastically dominates Fa(b) for a = 1.
Intuitively, ambiguity, together with max-min preferences makes the high bidder believe
that the other bidder is more likely a high type and so induces the bidder to bid more
aggressively. This is the competition e¤ect; ambiguity over correlation through the prior
implies that one can consider di¤erent possibilities for the type of the other bidder (and
hence her bid). Ambiguity averse bidder will consider the worst case scenario and hence
will believe that she faces the toughest possible competition, which will lead her to bid
more aggressively, thus increasing the sellers revenue.
In the second-price auction, this e¤ect does not exist as it is still weakly dominant to
bid your value. Once the value is known, then the others bid is not relevant. We then
have:11
Proposition 1. For private value auctions: (i) In the rst-price auction, the equilib-
11The proofs are in the Appendix.
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rium distribution of bids when a > 1 rst order stochastically dominates that of the case
in which a = 1; with the sellers revenues increasing in a: (ii) In the second-price auction,
the equilibrium distribution of bids when a > 1 is the same as that of the case in which
a = 1:
3.2 Common values
We now analyse the common values case. In this case an additional e¤ect of ambiguity
emerges, as players learn about their value from the equilibrium behaviour of others. Thus,
in addition to minimizing their utility by envisaging a low probability of winning, bidders
may also choose beliefs that minimize the value of the good conditional on winning.
This winners value e¤ect will sometimes induce an opposite incentive compared with
the competition e¤ect; the competition e¤ect can potentially induce bidders to bid more
aggressively perceiving a tougher competition; the winners value e¤ect can induce players
to bid less aggressively if they perceive lower valuations upon winning. Bidders can then
shed their bids even further than they would absent ambiguity.
Recall that bidders perceive correlation structures as depicted in Table 2, and so am-
biguity is over the correlation parameters 0; 1: Let us consider the low type of bidder
1. Suppose she uses the equilibrium bid of the low type of bidder 2, denoted as ba(l); so






Pr(ljl; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjl; l)  ba(l));
where









Note that the competition e¤ect will imply that to minimize utility one has to minimize
the probability of winning, 1 + 0: On the other hand, the winners value e¤ect will
demand that 1
0+1
is minimized, which is best achieved when 1 is minimized and 0 is
maximized. When we put the two together, the expression becomes
1(1  ba(l))  0ba(l)
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which implies that the worst case scenario is indeed (0; 1); and so the winners value
e¤ect dominates, as values are chosen to minimize E(0;1)(vjl; l): In the rst-price action
the low type will remain without rent, so that indeed b = ba(l) = E(0;1)(vjl; l): This is
also the bid that arises in the second-price auction, where the players use the valuation
that is based on both bidders receiving their own signal. We therefore have derived that
the bid of the low type is lower than in the case with no ambiguity, in both types of
auctions.
What about the high type? The intuition will be clearer in the second-price auction
where pure strategies are used (but the results are qualitatively similar as Proposition 2
illustrates). Consider the high type of bidder 1. In the second-price auction, her expected
utility when she uses her opponents high type bid, so that b = ba(h) > ba(l) is
min
(0;1)
Pr(ljh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjl; h)  ba(l)) +
(1=2) Pr(hjh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; h)  ba(h));
where:
Pr(ljh; (0; 1)) = 1  1   0; E(0;1)(vjl; h) =
1  q   1
1  1   0
;
Pr(hjh; (0; 1)) = 1 + 0; E(0;1)(vjh; h) =
2q   1 + 1
1 + 0
:









(2q   1 + 1) + 1  q   1   ba(l)]
The competition and winners value e¤ects now incorporate the possibility of winning
both against the low type and against another high type, as well as the magnitude of the
equilibrium bid of the low type. The terms 1
2
(2q 1+1)+1 q 1 express the expected
valuation upon winning. It is easy to see that to minimize utility, one needs to maximize
1: The rst element, (1 + 0)(ba(l)  12ba(h)); denotes the expected payment given the
two events in which the high type bidder can win. Recall that ba(l) = E(0;1)(vjl; l) =
1
1+0
; which is lower than but related to (1 q)
2
(1 q)2+q2 . Thus, when q is low so that signals
are imprecise, ba(l) can be relatively high, implying that to minimize utility one has
to minimize 1 and 0; while when q is high, ba(l) is relatively low, implying that to
minimize utility, one has to maximize both. In the case when q is high, both e¤ects are
then in tandem implying that the bidder chooses (0; 1). This means that the bid is
ba(h) = E(1;0)(vjh; h); which will be lower compared to the case of no ambiguity. Thus
the winners value upon winning against a high type, a more likely event, is indeed lower.
In the case of a low q; where the competition and winners value e¤ect may clash, the
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latter dominates implying that the bidder chooses (0; 1): The e¤ect now is more subtle;
while this belief minimizes E(0;1)(vjl; h); the winners value when she wins against a low
type, it can, for a low a; increase E(0;1)(vjh; h) beyond the canonical case.
We then have:
Proposition 2. For common value auctions: (i) Second price auctions: In the unique
symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, compared to the canonical model, the low types bid
decreases in a; and the high types bid decreases in a for either a high enough a or a high
enough q and increases in a when both a and q are low : (ii) First-price auctions: For a
su¢ ciently low a; in the unique symmetric equilibrium, compared to the canonical model,
the bid of the low type decreases in a; the maximal bid of the high type increases in a;
with the average bid of the high type increasing or decreasing depending on q:
It is interesting to note that di¤erent types use di¤erent joint information structures,
and thus the model is not equivalent to one in which individuals simply have the wrong
belief over correlation. In other words, ambiguity interacts with equilibrium behaviour
in a non-trivial manner. This was harder to see in the private values case where the low
type always bids her value; however in the common value case, the low type is utilising a
di¤erent belief to minimise her utility compared with the high type, and moreover, as the
result illustrates, the winners value e¤ect dominates so that the low type (and in most
environments also the high type) end up lowering their bid compared with the canonical
model.
3.3 Sellers revenue
In the case of private values we had seen that the sellers revenue increases with ambiguity
over correlation, as bids increase (at least in the rst-price auction). The case of common
values yields a di¤erent result, as can be gleaned from the fact that bids may decrease
with a: As we show in the Appendix, in the common value case, even when the high type
increases her bid, compared to the case of no ambiguity, her expected utility evaluated
at the true joint probability distribution will be higher compared to the canonical model.
This arises as she increases her bid when q is low, which implies she is more likely to
encounter the low type and hence pay the low types bid which is lower than in the
canonical model. Thus, considering the utility of bidders and the seller, we have:
Proposition 3: For common value auctions: (i) Second price auction: The utility of
both the high and the low type increases in a and the sellers revenue decreases with a.
(ii) First price auction: The sellers revenue decreases in a. (iii) The sellers revenue is
higher in the rst-price rather than the second-price auction.
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In the common values case, ambiguity implies that bidders decrease their bids; it there-
fore allows them to gain a higher utility and implies that the sellers revenue decreases
with a. As another illustration of this, consider the second-price auction equilibrium in
the limit, where all information structures are feasible, and so ambiguity is very large. It
is the limit of the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibria that we characterise in the
Appendix, and it is characterised by ba(l) = 0 and ba(h) = q:12 Specically, the high type
believes that signals are fully correlated and so E(q;1 q)(vjh; h) = E(vjh): These bids are
the lowest among all equilibria and the sellers revenue is therefore substantially lower
compared with the canonical model.
This result is di¤erent than in the private values case. Intuitively, in the former case
ambiguity increased the competitiveness of the bids, and thus these increased. In the
common value case, ambiguity in general induced the bidders to minimize their utility by
minimising the value they expect to gain when they win, implying lower bids at least on
average.
The intuition for the result that the sellers revenue is higher in the rst-price auction
is as follows. In the second-price auction, an individuals payment depends on the others
bid and as a result, there are more elements in her utility in which her beliefs play a
role. For the case of no ambiguity, this implies that she conditions her behaviour on more
information, which increases the sellers revenue.13 For the case of ambiguity, this implies
that individuals have more possibilities to condition on their worst-case beliefs, which
decreases the sellers revenue. Intuitively, the competition e¤ect is more pronounced in
the rst price auction than in the second price auction. This is because in the rst price
auction the payment is directly related to the bid.
4 Optimal auctions
Our analysis here will focus on two results. First, consistent with results in the previous
section, the sellers maximum revenue will increase with ambiguity in the private value
case but will decrease with ambiguity in the common values case. Second, the type of
optimal auction will also change when we switch from private to common values, and
specically, the seller will not necessarily fully insure the bidders.
Indeed the key issue when considering optimal auctions under ambiguity is the level
of insurance provided by the seller to the bidders. Under independent private values,
12This is supported by the low type believing 0 = 2q   1 and 1 = 0; and the high type believing
0 = q and 1 = 1  q:
13With private values and ambiguity over the prior, Lo (1998) shows that the rst-price auction dom-
inates the second-price auction in some environments.
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Bose et al (2006) show that the optimal mechanism fully insures the bidders against
ambiguity. In Bose et al (2006) bidders believe that valuations are independently drawn,
but face ambiguity regarding the particular distributions of valuations that others have.
In contrast, in our model bidders know the marginal distribution of valuations but face
ambiguity about the joint distribution of valuations. In Section 4.2 we replicate the full
insurance result in our setting. When reporting truthfully, the buyers are fully insured
against ambiguity. However, the competition e¤ect makes deviations less attractive, and
the seller is able to exploit this by asking the high type to pay more compared to the
standard case without ambiguity.
In the common value case, however, the seller does not necessarily provide full insurance.
We show that when ambiguity is small or the signals su¢ ciently precise, the optimal
mechanism fully extracts rent (i.e. participation constraints are binding), using side bets
with the low type to deter the high type from deviating. These side bets expose the low
type to ambiguity, and as a result the seller cannot extract full surplus.
Moreover, the seller will allocate the object to the buyer with the highest signal, which
exposes the high type to ambiguity as well. As a result, the seller is then able to insure the
high type against the competition e¤ect but not the winners value e¤ect. Specically, as
we show in Section 4.3, when the two players receive di¤erent signals, the seller allocates
the object to the high type; the winners value e¤ect then implies that the high type will
undervalue the object, but the seller is able to partially insure the high type by also asking
her to pay more when her opponent is low type. Under optimal transfers the high type
does not care whether her opponent has received the high or the low signal that is, the
high type is insured against the competition e¤ect. On the other hand when ambiguity is
large and the signals imprecise, the seller fully insures the buyers, leaving the high type
with positive rents.
4.1 The sellers problem
We now formalise the sellers problem. A direct mechanism (x; t) is an allocation rule
x : fl; hg2 7! [0; 1]2 and a transfer rule t : fl; hg2 7! R2. Let Ui (s0; s) be is utility
from reporting s0 when is signal is s, given that the information structure is . A direct
mechanism is maxmin incentive compatible if for all s 2 fl; hg:
min





for all s0 2 fl; hg. The revelation principle applies in this setting as long as we make the
following assumption:













This assumption is standard in the literature on mechanism design with maxmin agents
(see for example, Bose et al 2006 or Wolitzky 2016). In what follows, we restrict attention
to maxmin incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
4.2 Private values
In the private value case, qi(si = ljvi = L) = qi(si = hjvi = H) = 1. For each signal
s 2 fl; hg, let vs 2 fL;Hg be the valuation associated with the signal. That is, let vl = L
and vh = H: Let p denote a buyers belief that her opponent has received the same signal
as her. The ePMI constraints imply, following Table 1 in Section 3, that 1
2a
 p  1  1
2a
:




























p [vsxi(s; s)  ti(s; s)] + (1  p) [vsxi(s; s0)  ti(s; s0)]  0
for all i, and for all s; s0 2 fl; hg.
As in Bose et al (2006), when values are private, the seller nds it optimal to fully insure
the buyers against ambiguity and is able to extract full surplus when the ambiguity is
large:
Proposition 4. When buyers have private values:
(i) Any optimal mechanism is a full insurance mechanism
(ii) The optimal allocation rule depends on L: if L < 1
1+a
, it is not optimal to sell to
buyers with the low valuation, but if L > 1
1+a
, the seller always allocates the object.
(iii) The sellers revenue is increasing in ambiguity, and as a ! 1, converges to full
surplus.




In the common values case, the possible joint information structures are described in






q2 + (1  q)2
 " 2X
i=1






ti(l; h) + ti(h; l)
#
subject to incentive and participation constraints:
min
0;1
1xi(l; l) + (1  q   1)xi(l; h)  (0 + 1)ti(l; l)  (1  0   1)ti(l; h)
 min
0;1
1xi(h; l) + (1  q   1)xi(h; h)  (0 + 1)ti(h; l)  (1  0   1)ti(h; h)
min
0;1
(1  q   1)xi(h; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(h; h)  (1  0   1)ti(h; l)  (0 + 1)ti(h; h)
 min
0;1
(1  q   1)xi(l; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(l; h)  (1  0   1)ti(l; l)  (0 + 1)ti(l; h)
min
0;1
1xi(l; l) + (1  q   1)xi(l; h)  (0 + 1)ti(l; l)  (1  0   1)ti(l; h)  0
min
0;1
(1  q   1)xi(h; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(h; h)  (1  0   1)ti(h; l)  (0 + 1)ti(h; h)  0
For a given a, the optimal mechanism will depend on two cuto¤ values of q, which we
now dene. Let q(a) be the solution to q2+(1 q)2 0 1 = 0+1+0+1 1 that lies
between 1
2
and 1, and let q(a) be the solution to q2+(1 q)2 0 1 = 3q 2+1+1
that lies between 1
2
and 1. We derive the explicit expressions for q(a); q(a) in the
Appendix. For 1 < a <1, q(a) < q(a). We then have:
Proposition 5. When buyers have common values:
(i) When q  q(a), an optimal mechanism allocates the good with equal probability for
each player disregarding their type, and a transfer of 1
2
(1  q). The revenue of the seller
is 1  q, both types are fully insured, and the high type earns positive rents.
(ii) When q  q(a), the optimal mechanism allocates the good to the high type and
with equal probability to each player if both are of the same type. Transfers are such that
the high type is partially insured, the seller makes side bets with the low type, and the
buyers earn no rents.
(iii) When q(a) < q < q(a), the optimal mechanism allocates the good to the high
type and with equal probability to each player if both are of the same type. There are no
side bets with the low type, both types are partially insured, and the high type earns positive
rents.
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3), and as a! 1, both q(a)
and q(a) converge to 1
2
.
(v) Sellers revenue (weakly, and sometimes strictly) decreases with a:
When q  q(a), an implementation of the optimal mechanism is for the seller to rst
choose each buyer with equal probability, and then sell to the chosen buyer at price 1  q.
Since the decision to sell is not based on the signal realisation, the good is worth 1   q
to the low type and q to the high type. Thus, the high type earns positive rents in
equilibrium. Note that this mechanism is e¢ cient, and that given the sellers design,
ambiguity is not relevant or does not arise in equilibrium.
When q  q(a), the participation constraint of the high type is binding: it is optimal
to fully extract rent. The seller engages in a side bet with the low type to prevent the
high type from deviating. Unlike in the classical case, side bets are costly to the seller, so
the seller uses the smallest bet that is su¢ cient to prevent the high type from deviating.
To reduce this cost further, the seller allocates the good to the high type when the players
receive di¤erent signals, which generates endogenous ambiguity over the expected value
of the good. The seller is able to partially insure the high type by asking her to pay more
when the other player has received a low signal. In this case, the expected payment from




(1  (1  q)2)  1
2
(q2   0):






q2 + (1  q)2   0   1
 1  q   1   1
2(0 + 1 + 0 + 1   1)
:
The low type chooses 0 and 1 both to minimise the perceived surplus from winning
the object and to maximise the perceived value of the transfers. Note that in the optimal
mechanism, the belief of the high type regarding 1 is irrelevant. The high type does
not care about the type of her opponent: she gets the same utility from any belief about
1. In this sense, she is insured against the competition e¤ect. On the other hand she
believes that 0 = 0. This gives rise to the winners value e¤ect: her expectation of the
value conditional on winning, 1 1
2 0 1
, is lower than true conditional expectation (for any
belief 1 2 [1; 1]). When a converges to 1, only this case remains.
The intuition why participation constraints must bind when a is small is as follows. If
the participation constraint of the high type is slack, the seller can achieve a rst order
increase in revenue by increasing the payment of the high type. In order to ensure that
the incentive constraint is not violated, the seller can increase ti(l; h) and decrease ti(l; l)
in such a way that keeps the low type indi¤erent, but lowers the high types utility from
deviating. Since the low type may have di¤erent beliefs to the seller, these changes in
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transfers may decrease the sellers revenue; however, as the ambiguity becomes small,
this fall in revenue converges to zero. On the other hand, the increase in revenue from
increasing the payment of the high type is xed.
When q(a) < q < q(a), it is optimal to allocate the good to the high type when
the players receive di¤erent signals, but it is not optimal to conduct side bets with the
low type. Instead, the high type earns positive rents in equilibrium in order to satisfy
the incentive constraint. The winners value e¤ect implies that the buyers underestimate
the value of the object conditional on winning. However, the seller partially insures both
types, so that the competition e¤ect does not arise.14 This interval shrinks as a goes to
either 1 or 1.
If buyers are fully insured against ambiguity, then the sellers revenue is constant in
ambiguity. However, in the cases where buyers are not fully insured, the sellers revenue
is strictly decreasing in ambiguity. The intuition is that as ambiguity increases, the larger
winners value e¤ect forces the seller to decrease transfers. Thus, the sellers revenue is
always (weakly) decreasing in ambiguity.
Note that Crémer and McLean (1988) show that some of the conclusions from the
analysis of optimal auctions with independent private values are not robust. For example,
since surplus extraction is possible when signals are correlated, the optimal mechanism is
e¢ cient and leaves no rents to the buyers. Proposition 5 shows that these results continue
to hold for a close to 1.15 On the other hand, when a is large, it is possible for buyers
to earn positive rents in the optimal mechanism. Note that in this environment, it is
always possible to fully extract rent (see Renou 2015); however, as we have argued, rent
extraction conicts with full insurance and is not necessarily optimal when ambiguity is
large.
5 Extensions
We now extend the model of Section 3 in two ways. We rst consider the case of many
bidders and then consider continuous valuations. In each of these extensions we consider
di¤erent models of correlation which illustrates the exibility of the framework. The key
results of Section 3 extend to these environments as well: sellers revenue decreases with
ambiguity for common value auctions.
14For the low type, any belief about 0 gives the same utility, but she believes that 1 = 1, so
that her expected value of the object conditional on winning, 10+1 is smaller than the true conditional
expectation for any belief 0 2 [0; 0]:
15The set of optimal mechanisms when a = 1 is large. As a! 1, the optimal mechanism described in
Proposition 5, which is the unique symmetric mechanism when a is close to 1, converges to an optimal
mechanism for the case when a = 1.
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5.1 Many bidders
Our analysis above focused on the case of two bidders. In this section we consider a model
with common values and many bidders. Naturally when extending the model to more than
two bidders, many correlation patterns can be considered; we now extend the model in the
simplest way that also maintains symmetry and anonymity when a single bidder considers
the correlation between herself and all other bidders. Specically, consider a population
of n bidders, who consider distributions of the following form: with probability 0 2 [0; a],
all bidders receive the same signal in state 0, and with probability 1 2 [0; a], all bidders
receive the same signal in state 1. This signal, s 2 fl; hg; is drawn from the same
marginal distribution as before; that is, Pr(s = hjv = 1) = Pr(s = ljv = 0) = q > 1
2
:
With the remaining probability, each bidder draws a (conditionally) independent signal,
again, with Pr(si = hjv = 1) = Pr(si = ljv = 0) = q > 12 for all i: Bidders have ambiguity
then over 1 and 0; as before.
To see that similar considerations are involved, consider a low type. Intuitively, a low
type wins only when she faces n  1 low types. Minimizing utility implies as before that
she will minimize her winning probability in state 1 and maximize it in state 0. This
implies that she sets up the correlation among bidders to be the highest in state 0, as
positive correlation implies the highest probability of having a vector of identical types.
Alternatively, she uses the belief that correlation is lowest in state 1; with independent
signals the probability of any specic vector of valuations is the lowest. But of course
this means that conditioning on a vector of low types implies that state 0 is more likely,
inducing a strictly lower bid.
We are then able to show:
Proposition 6: When ambiguity is not too large, small a, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in the rst-price auction. Moreover, there exists n; such that for all n > n; in
this equilibrium the high type conditions her bid on the belief (0; 1) = (0; a); and the low
type conditions her bid on the belief (0; 1) = (a; 0): The (expected) bids of both types
are lower than in the independent case, and the sellers revenues decrease with ambiguity.
For the high type (who uses a mixed strategy in equilibrium), the considerations are
more complicated as she needs to consider many vectors of types, each a¤ecting both the
probability of winning and her valuation. However, for a large n; for example in the low
state, under independence (0 = 0); the most likely event includes n(1 q) high types and
nq low types. Thus perceiving more correlation shifts the weight from this event to the
event in which they are all correlated. This increases utility by increasing the probability
of paying a lower price in expectations (as one competes with a smaller number of high
types). Thus to minimize utility we have to reduce correlation in the low state. Similar
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intuition arises in the high state. This belief implies that the expected bid is lower than
in the benchmark independent model, and as a result, sellers revenue is lower as well.
While we can verify analytically that the above holds also for small n (e.g., n = 3); an
analytical proof for all n can be derived for a large n only.
Note that we focus in this case on a rst-price auction as symmetric equilibria in the
second-price auction may not exist with discrete types and many bidders.16
6 Continuous signals
We show that the results of Section 3 are robust to the case of a continuum of signals. In
the common-value case, let the state of the world be v 2 f0; 1g; with an equal prior. We
revert to the case of two bidders, where each now receives a signal si 2 [0; 1] about the
state of the world: The marginal distributions determining the signals given the state of
the world, gv(s) for each player, are known to the players. To simplify, let g0(s) = 2(1 s)
and g1(s) = 2s (more generally we require in the Appendix that g0(s) is decreasing
and g1(s) is increasing, so that that G0(s) is concave and G1(s) is convex). Note that
G0(s) > G1(s) for all interior s; and hence MLRP is satised too.
Individuals have ambiguity over a set of joint distributions in each state v 2 f0; 1g:
We use a simple set of joint distributions, the F-G-M transformation (copula), which was
introduced by Morgenstern in 1956. Specically, given gv(s); we have:
fv(s) = [1 + v(2Gv(s1)  1)(2Gv(s2)  1)]gv(s1)gv(s2):
For this to be a distribution, for any v we need jvj  1:17 Note that when v > 0
we have positive correlation of signals in state v while when v < 0 we have negative
correlation. When signals are conditionally independent, we have v = 0 for all v: Adding




  1; 1  1
a
] for v 2 f0; 1g:
We analyze a second-price auction and show very similar results to the one derived in
Section 3. Let us rst write the utility of a player for each bid b: This is










where b(s0) is the bid used by the other player and z = b 1(b). In the Appendix we show
that when the level of ambiguity a is small enough, there exists a symmetric equilibrium
16This is a general issue that does not relate to our specic model.






(vjs; s) = [1 + 

1(2G1(s)  1)2]g21(s)
[1 + 1(2G1(s)  1)2]g21(s) + [1 + 0(2G0(s)  1)2]g20(s)
: (1)
where (s) minimizes the utility for each bid/type. To do so, a player needs to consider
how correlation a¤ects both the competition and the winners value e¤ects, at each state.
As before, low types (specically, below the median of G0)18 minimize their utility by
postulating the highest possible positive correlation at state 0 and the highest possible
negative correlation at state 1, given the strong winners value e¤ect. They therefore
minimize their valuation upon winning (as they only win when the other player has even
lower signals) which implies underbidding.
For high types, positive correlation in state 1 and in state 0 decreases their utility as
it implies paying a higher bid (while their probability of winning is relatively high in any
case). This implies that they choose the maximum positive correlation in both states.
This was also the case in the discrete case and again implies underbidding as conditional
on their signal, and as G0(s) > G1(s) > 12 for these types, f0(s; s) > f1(s; s) for any xed
positive : Thus b(s;) < b(s; 0):
We therefore have:
Proposition 7When the level of ambiguity a is small enough, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in the second-price auction in which which b(s;) is as dened in ( 1); where
(s) minimizes the utility of type s in equilibrium, and the sellers revenues decrease with
ambiguity.
In the Appendix we generalise for other symmetric gv(s); and characterise a su¢ cient
condition for the marginal distribution function for which revenues decrease more gen-
erally. We also consider in the Appendix for compeletness the private value case, where
we assume that valuations are drawn from [0; 1] according to a uniform distribution,
and individuals believe that the joint distribution is f(v) = 1 + (2vi   1)(2vj   1), for
 2 [ 1
a
  1; 1   1
a
]: We characterise a symmetric equilibrium and show that bids in the
rst-price auction are uniformly higher compared to the case without ambiguity (recall
that bids in the second-price auction are not a¤ected by ambiguity).
7 Conclusion
We have constructed a framework in which we can analyze ambiguity over correlation in
information structures of bidders both in the private and in the common value auctions.
18The median is important as the F-G-M copula is of the form 2G  1:
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We have illustrated in this paper that ambiguity over correlation induces di¤erent results
in the private values versus the common values auctions. Specically, while sellers revenue
increases in the private value auctions, it decreases in the common value auctions. The
key insight of the analysis is that in the common value auctions players choose worst-case
beliefs that amount to minimising the value of the good conditional on winning. This also
leads to the optimal auction providing less than full insurance to bidders.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1:
We consider equilibria where the low type bids L and the high type mixes on the support
[L; b]. It can be shown that this equilibrium is unique.19 First note that the low type
gets zero utility in equilibrium; any bid higher than L yields negative utility, and any bid
below L yields 0 utility.
As in the main text, the expected utility from bidding b for the high type is:
min
p=2;(a)(a)
((1  p) + pF (b))(1  b);
which is minimised by maximising : As the ePMI constraints are:
1
4









which implies a probability that the opponent has
a high value of 1  1
2a
:
Now we compute the highest bid, b; in the support of F (b): For the highest bid we have:
19For uniqueness, rst observe that there cannot be pure strategy equilibria, and that in any equilibrium
the low type cannot earn positive rents. In any equilibrium, the low type of both players must bid L.
Suppose that the low type of player 1 bids strictly less than L with positive probability; then the low type
of player 2 can get positive rents. But this contradicts the fact that the low type cannot earn positive
rents in equilibrium. Thus assume that each low type bids at least L (so the utility of the low type is at
most zero). Suppose that at least one low type bids strictly more than L with positive probability, and
without loss of generality assume that the low type of player 1 wins the auction with positive probability
with a bid strictly higher than L (and receiving strictly negative utility). Then the low type of player 1
has a protable deviation to bidding L with probability 1. Thus assume that both low types bid L in
equilibrium. The bottom of the support of the mixed strategy for the high type must be L, otherwise a
high type who is supposed to bid just above the bottom of the support can bid just below the support
and reduce expected payment without changing the probability of winning. The indi¤erence condition
then uniquely determines the equilibrium.
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(1  b) = ( 1
2a





+ "(a) = 1   1
2a




(1   L) > 0: Computing F 12+"(a)(b)








1 b and so F
1
2+"(a)(b) stochastically dominates F 12 (b) and thus
sellers revenues are higher when a > 1 and increase in a:
Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3:20
Lemma A. In the common value second-price auction, the unique symmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium satises:
1. The low type bids ba(l) = E(0;1)(vjl; l), a bid that decreases in a;
2. For all a  q
1 q ; there exist cuto¤s q; q; with 0:5 < q < q < 1; where:
(a) For q2(0:5; q); the high type bids ba(h) = E(0;1)(vjh; h), a bid that increases
with a.
(b) For q2(q; 1); the high type bids ba(h) = E(0;1)(vjh; h); a bid that decreases
with a:
(c) For q2 (q; q); the high type bids ba(h) = E(0;1)(vjh; h) for some 0 satisfying
E(0;1)(vjh; h) = 2E(0;1)(vjl; l); a bid that decreases with a:
3. For all a  a(q)  q
1 q ; the high type bids ba(h) = E(0;1)(vjh; h):
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Proof of Lemma A: We consider monotone equilibria where ba(l) < ba(h), ba(l) =






Under the "no hedging" condition, deviations to mixed strategies will have lower utility,
and thus equilibria are easier to sustain. We use this to characterize equilibria for large
values of a: Of course all equilibria derived without the "no hedging" condition will remain
equilibria under the "no hedging" condition.
20For simplicity we set L = 0 but the proof is easily extended to L > 0:
21When q is not too small, a(q) = q1 q : When q is su¢ ciently close to 0.5, a(q) >
q
1 q and symmetric
pure-strategy equilibria may not exist in the region [ q1 q ; a(q)].
22Note that in any pure strategy equilibrium where ba(l) < ba(h), we must have ba(l) = E(0;1)(vjl; l)




1): For example, suppose that ba(l) >
E(0;1)(vjl; l) for all (0; 1): Then the low type gets negative utility, which contradicts ba(l) being an
equilibrium strategy. Suppose that ba(l) < E(0;1)(vjl; l) for all (0; 1). Then the equilibrium utility for






> 0; but the low type has a protable
deviation to ba(l) + ", which yields utility min(0;1) Pr(ljl; (0; 1))
 
E(0;1)[vjl; l]  ba(l)  "

. The
argument for the high type is similar.
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1   (1 + 0)ba(l)
where  = 1 if b > ba(l) and 12 otherwise. This is minimised by (0; 1). Thus the
conjectured equilibrium bid is ba(l) = E(0;1)(vjl; l): This will be the case for all equilibria
considered.
Equilibrium with over-bidding for the high type:
Consider now the high type. Consider the case of an equilibrium that satises ba(l) >
1
2





























Since by assumption ba(l) > 12ba(h), the payo¤ is minimised by (0; 1). Thus the conjec-













has to be non negative and thus under (0; 1); we must have E(0;1)[vjl; h]  ba(l):
We now consider deviations.












where 0  1  0  1. Under the information structure (0; 1), the rst term is 0.
Note that E(0;1)[vjh; l] < ba(h) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for no deviation.
In that case, players bid b = ba(l); use (0; 1) as the information structure, and the
equilibrium payo¤ is 0.
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Let us now consider the high type. As long as the other player is playing the equilibrium













where 0  1  0  1. Under the information structure (0; 1), E(0;1)[vjh; h] = ba(h),





which is the equilibrium payo¤. Thus, it is not protable to deviate to any mixed strategy.
Bringing together all the conditions, we now have:
E(0;1)[vjl; h] > E(0;1)[vjl; l]





For a  q




































Condition (1) and (2) are satised for all q; while condition (3) is satised for all
q < q(a):
For a  q


















(1 q)2+2q 1 > 0; is not
satised for a which is above a cuto¤ a. Note that allowing for no hedging will not a¤ect
the existence of this equilibrium for high a:
Equilibria with under-bidding for the high type:
Next consider the case ba(l) < 12ba(h): Consider the high type, and assume that the
other player is playing the equilibrium strategy (ba(l); ba(h)).














which is like solving
min
(0;1)





















For ba(l) < 12ba(h), this is minimised by (0; 1).



















where 0  1  0  1. Under the information structure (0; 1), E(0;1)[vjh; h] = ba(h):
Note that this bid decreases with a:
Note that in equilibrium we must have
 
E(0;1)[vjl; h]  E(0;1)[vjl; l]

 0, and that
the equilibrium maximises the probability of winning against the low type.













Under the information structure (0; 1), the rst term is 0. Thus a necessary and su¢ -
cient condition for the low type not to deviate is E(0;1)[vjh; l] < E(0;1)[vjh; h]:
The equilibrium conditions as described above are therefore:
(4) E(0;1)[vjl; h] > E(0;1)[vjl; l]
(5) E(0;1)[vjh; l] < E(0;1)[vjh; h]




Conditions (4) and (5) are satised for a  q
1 q ; while condition (6) is satised for
q > q(a):
To consider a > q
1 q ; consider deviations of the low type under the "no hedging"
condition. Her utility from a mixed strategy which wins against the low type only with
probability  and with probability 1   wins against the low type with probability 1 as



























is (0; 1); and thus this
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A necessary and su¢ cient condition under the no hedging condition is for the above
utility to be lower than 0, the equilibrium utility.
Thus, for a > q
1 q ; the equilibrium conditions are:
(4) E(0;1)[vjl; h] > E(0;1)[vjl; l]
(5) Pr(ljl; (0; 1))
 














This equilibrium exists when a > a(q)  q
1 q ; where a(q) >
q
1 q for a low enough q but
a(q) = q
1 q otherwise:
Note also that the equilibrium converges to the equilibrium in the limit where all infor-
mation structures are allowed. To see the limit equilibrium, suppose that ba(l) = 0: For
the low type we minimize 1 at 0 and set 0 = 2q   1 (which she is indi¤erent to) and
hence E(vjl; l) = 0: We are therefore in the case in which ba(l) < 12ba(h) and hence the
high type uses 0 = q and 1 = 1  q: As a result, ba(h) = q = E(vjh) < E(vjh; h): This
yields to the seller the lowest revenue.
Finally, consider the case ba(l) = 12ba(h): We will show that this equilibrium holds for
a < q
1 q ; for values q(a) < q < q(a):
Let a and q satisfy: 1
2




Consider the high type, and assume that the other player is playing the equilibrium
strategy (ba(l); ba(h)).














Since ba(l) = 12ba(h), both (0; 1) and (0; 1) achieve the minimum payo¤.
















> 0 for any (0; 1) and increasing 0 relaxes



















1  ba(l)  q + 1(2q   1) + 0ba(l)(1  21) + 1 (1[1  2ba(l)]  [1  ba(l)])




Suppose that 1 >
1
2








, since E(0;1)[vjh; h] > ba(h). Thus, for 1 6=
1
2




, which is the equilibrium payo¤.













Under the information structure (0; 1), the rst term is 0 and the second term is negative
if E(0;1)[vjh; l] < ba(h).
So for this to hold we need 1
2






E(0;1)[vjh; l] < E(0;1)[vjl; l]; which is satised for the range of qs considered.
Equilibria in the rst price auction: We will now show that the maximum bid
increases in a; and that the minimum bid decreases in a; for a close to 1.









0( ba(l)) + 1(1  ba(l))
which is resolved by setting 0 to be the highest possible value and 1 to be the lowest
possible value, given the ePMI constraints. Therefore for a su¢ ciently close to 1; the
solution is (0; 1):
Note that the low type cannot earn positive rents in equilibrium, and thus we set:






(1  q)2 + a(1  q)2 + 2q   1
<
(1  q)2
(1  q)2 + q2
Taking a derivative of E(0;1)(vjl; l) with respect to a; it is straightforward to see that it
is negative. Thus the bid of the low type decreases with a: We will establish later that
this type will not want to use any other bid given the behaviour of the high type.
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Now let us consider the high type. Wlog we can consider a mixed strategy with support
on [ba(l);ba(h)]; as bidding less than ba(l) will provide a zero utility.
First let us consider a bid just above ba(l) which allows the individual to win against
the low type only. We then need to solve the following,
min
(0;1)
Pr(ljh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; l)  ba(l))
= min
(0;1)
(q   0)( ba(l)) + (1  q   1)(1  ba(l));
which yields the need to maximize 1 and to minimize 0: The solution is (0; 1):
Note that this bid provides a utility of Pr(ljh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; l)   E(0;1)(vjl; l));
and that 0 + 1 = 0   1:
We now consider the highest bid in the support, ba(h): Such bid implies winning for
sure and thus unambiguous gain of E(vjh): To be indi¤erent, this bid has to satisfy
E(vjh)  ba(h)




(hjh)E(0;1)(vjh; h) + Pr(ljh; (0; 1))E(0;1)(vjl; l)
= 2q   1 + 1 + (1  0   1)
1
0 + 1





















  1)(1  q)2 + q2
)







+a 1)(1 q)2+q2 ; evaluated at a = 1; is
(2q 1)2
2q2 2q+1 > 0:
Thus the maximum bid increases in a.
We now continue to characterize the equilibrium distribution. Let us consider the worst
case scenario in terms of utility for some distribution F (b) with density f(b): The expected
utility is Z
b
f(b)[Pr(ljh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; l)  b) +





(1  F (b)) Pr(hjh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; h)  b)]db
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To choose the information structure to minimize utility, we maximise
Pr(hjh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; h)  b)
= (2q   1) + (0( b) + 1(1  b))
and the solution is therefore, for all b, to maximize 1 and to minimize 0.
F (b) is characterized by using the indi¤erence condition under the belief (0; 1):
Pr(ljh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; l)  b) +
Pr(hjh; (0; 1))F (b)(E(0;1)(vjh; h)  b)
= Pr(ljh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; l)  ba(l))
implying that
Fa(b) =
Pr(ljh; (0; 1))(b  ba(l))
Pr(hjh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjh; h)  b)
:
We complete the equilibrium characterization by showing that given the strategy of the
high type, the low type will not deviate.




Pr(ljl; (0; 1))(E(0;1)(vjl; l)  b) +
Pr(hjl; (0; 1))Fa(b)(E(0;1)(vjl; h)  b)
= min
(0;1)
(v   b)(0(1  Fa(b)) + Fa(b)q) + (v   b)(1(1  Fa(b)) + Fa(b)(1  q))
As Fa(b)  1; the solution is (1; 0):




(E(0;1)(vjl; h)  b) =

































all a: Thus the utility is negative and the low type does not deviate.
Sellers revenue in the rst price auction. Expected payment to seller, , is given
by the linear combination of receiving the bid of the low type (when both are l), the
expected bid of the high type (when only one is h), and the maximum bid of the two h
types:


















 = Pr(ljl), according to the true (independent) information structure,  = Pr(ljl; (0; 1))
according to the belief of the high bidder, (0; 1), x = E(0;1)[vjh; h]; y = E(0;1)[vjl; l] =
ba(l):We therefore also have ba(h) = x + (1   )y; Fa(b) = 1 
b y












Proof of Fact 1:

























(1 q)2 =   (q   1)
2 2a+2q+2aq2 4aq 1
(a2q2 2a2q+a2+2aq a+q2 2q+1)2 :






; and thus overall average bid for
the high type decreases. In all other cases, the high type reduces her bid with a: Finally
the bid of the low type is always lower than in the canonical model. This implies also





Proof of Fact 2:




1 = a(1  q)2 + 1a(1  q)
2 + 2q   1
@









Fact 3 The bid of the low type is decreasing in a:
Proof of Fact 3: Follows from Fact 1.
Fact 4 (i)
E[ba(h)] = x(1 +
1  

ln(1  ))  y1  

ln(1  ):
(ii) At a = 1; the expected bid of the high type decreases in a for low q and increases in
a for high q:







x b (x  b ln (x  b) + x ln (x  b)) =
x (b x) ln(x b)














(b x)2db = x(1 +
1 





@a ja=1 = 0 and
@x











@a ja=1(1 + 2
1 2(1 q)2 2q+1
2(1 q)2+2q 1 ln(1  2(1  q)
2   2q + 1)):
For q > 1
2
; the expression (1 + 21 2(1 q)
2 2q+1
2(1 q)2+2q 1 ln(1   2(1   q)
2   2q + 1)) is strictly
increasing, negative for q < q and positive for q > q for some q 2 (0:5; 1): As @x





bia(h)] = (x  y) 2((
1  

)2 ln (1  )  1  

) + x
(ii) The expectation of the maximal bid when both are high types decreases in a for low
q and increases in a for high q:






2 ln (x  b) + 2x2 ln (x  b)  4bx+ 2by   xy + 3x2   4bx ln (x  b)) =





















)2 (x  y) (ln (1  )+
(2x 2y 3x+2y)
2(1 )2(x y) ) =   (x  y) 2((
1 

)2 ln (1  ) + 1 

) + x:


























2 ln(1  )  4 2q(1 q)
q2+(1 q)2 + 1)
For the expression ( 4( 2q(1 q)
q2+(1 q)2 )
2 ln(1 2q(1 q)) 4 2q(1 q)
q2+(1 q)2 +1) there is a q 2 (0:5; 1)
such that the expression is negative for q < q and positive for q > q: As @x
@a
> 0; we are
done.




y + (1  )x+ 1  





(x  y)  ln(1  )  1

(



















ln (1  ) + 1))
Taking a derivative with respect to a; recalling that d






















(   1) < 0:
Sellers revenue in the second price auction and a comparison across auc-
tions: We now consider the sellers revenue in the second price auction and show that
the prots of the seller are higher in the rst-price auction.
In the second price auction, the low type always bids E(0;1)[vjl; l], and the high
type bids at most E(0;1)[vjh; h] (either ba(h) = E(0;1)[vjh; h] for low a and q, where
E(0;1)[vjh; h] > E(01)[vjh; h] = ba(h) for higher q and a, or where E(0;1)[vjh; h] >
2E(0;1)[vjl; l] = ba(h)). Let R
SPA be the revenue from a virtual auction where the low
type bids E(0;1)[vjl; l] and the high type bids E(0;1)[vjh; h]. Then the actual revenue
in the second price auction must be weakly less than RSPA.
The sellers revenue in the second price auction satises:









where x = E(0;1)[vjh; h], y = E(0;1)[vjl; l], and  = Pr(ljl). The sellers revenue in






















ln(1  ) + 1

where  = Pr(ljl; (0; 1)). Thus, the di¤erence in revenue between the two auctions
is:







ln(1  ) + 1

> 0:






























































8.2 Proofs for Section 4
Proposition 4A. Private value case: If L < 1
1+a
, (x; t) is an optimal mechanism if and
only if it satises:
 xi(l ; l) = x i(l ; h) = t i(l ; l) = t i(l ; h) = 0
 xi(h; l) = 1,
P2
i=1 xi(h; h) = 1
 ti(h; l) = 1
 ti(h; h) = x i(h; h)
That is, if both buyers have the low valuation, then the seller does not allocate the object.
If a single buyer has the high valuation, then she gets the object with probability 1. If both
buyers have the high valuation, the seller can allocate to either buyer. Transfers are such
that both buyers are fully insured against ambiguity and receive zero rents.
If L > 1
1+a
, (x; t) is an optimal mechanism if and only if it satises:
 xi(l ; h) = t i(l ; h) = 0

P2
i=1 xi(l ; l) = 1
 ti(l ; l) = Lx i(l ; l)
 xi(h; l) = 1,
P2
i=1 xi(h; h) = 1
 ti(h; h) = x i(h; h)  12a(1   L)x i(l ; l)
 ti(h; l) = 1  12a(1   L)x i(l ; l)
That is, the seller allocates the object with probability 1. If the buyers have di¤erent
valuations, the seller allocates to the one with the high valuation. Otherwise the seller
may allocate to either buyer. Low types receives zero rents. Transfers for high types are
pinned down by the binding incentive constraint and the full insurance condition.





ti(l; l) + ti(l; h) + ti(h; l) + ti(h; h) =






if L  1
1+a
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Proof of Proposition 4A: First, we argue that any optimal mechanism must be a
full insurance mechanism. Dene a full insurance mechanism as one in which the ex post
payo¤ of each buyer is independent of the type of her opponent:
Denition. The mechanism (x; t) is a full insurance mechanism if for each player i
and for each s; s0 2 fl; hg: vsxi(s; s)  ti(s; s) = vsxi(s; s0)  ti(s; s0):
Suppose that (x; t) is an optimal mechanism, but vsx1(s; s)   t1(s; s) > vsx1(s; s0)  
t1(s; s
0). Then the equilibrium belief for type s of player 1 is that her opponent is type s
with probability 1
2a
and type s0 with probability 1  1
2a
. Consider the alternative mechanism
(x0; t0) where:
 t01(s; s) = t1(s; s) + 
 t01(s; s0) = t1(s; s0)  12a 1
 x01(s0; ) = x1(s0; ) and t01(s0; ) = t1(s0; )
 x02(; ) = x2(; ) and t02(; ) = t2(; )
For su¢ ciently small :
 Type s of player 1 gets the same utility in (x0; t0) and (x; t) for every report
 Type s0 of player 1 gets the same utility in (x0; t0) and (x; t) from reporting s0
 Type s0 of player 1 gets weakly lower utility in (x0; t0) than in (x; t) from reporting s
 Both types of player 2 get the same utility in (x0; t0) and (x; t) for every report
 The seller gets a strictly higher revenue in (x0; t0) than in (x; t)
Thus, the new mechanism is incentive compatible, individually rational, and yields
strictly higher revenue to the seller.
Next, note that xi(l; h) = 0. For example, suppose that x1(l; h) > 0. Consider the
alternative mechanism (x0; t0) that di¤ers from (x; t) in the following way:
 x01(l; h) = x1(l; h)  
 t01(l; h) = t1(l; h)  L
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 x02(h; l) = x2(h; l) + 
 t02(h; l) = t2(h; l) + 
Note that (x0; t0) is incentive compatible, individually rational, and yields strictly higher
revenue to the seller.
We can ignore the participation constraint of the high type as it is implied by the
incentive constraint. Standard arguments imply that the participation constraint of the
low type is binding. Lemma 1 then implies that the transfers for the low type satisfy:
ti(l; l) = Lxi(l; l) (2)
ti(l; h) = 0 (3)
As usual, we ignore the incentive constraint of the low type and check ex post that it
is satised. Then the incentive constraint of the high type must bind:
min
p2
p [xi(h; h)  ti(h; h)] + (1  p) [xi(h; l)  ti(h; l)] = min
p2
(1  p) [xi(l; l)  ti(l; l)]
Since ti(l; l) = Lxi(l; l), minp2(1   p) [xi(l; l)  ti(l; l)] = 12a(1   L)xi(l; l). Lemma 1
implies that xi(h; h)  ti(h; h) = xi(h; l)  ti(h; l), so we have:
ti(h; h) = xi(h; h) 
1
2a
(1  L)xi(l; l) (4)
ti(h; l) = xi(h; l) 
1
2a
(1  L)xi(l; l) (5)









Clearly, it is optimal to set xi(h; l) = 1,
P2
i=1 xi(h; h) = 1, and
P2
i=1 xi(l; l) to be either
1 or 0, depending on the sign of L  1
a
(1  L).
Therefore, (x; t) solves the sellers problem if and only if the allocation rule satises:
xi(l; h) = 0
xi(h; l) = 1
2X
i=1





0 if L < 1
1+a
any w 2 [0; 1] if L = 1
1+a
1 if L > 1
1+a
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and transfers are given by equations 2 3, 4, and 5.
Proposition 5A. Common value case:
(i) When q  q(a), an optimal mechanism is, for i 2 f1; 2g:
 xi(l; l) = xi(h; h) = xi(l; h) = xi(h; l) = 12
 ti(h; l) = ti(h; h) = ti(l; h) = ti(l; l) = 12(1  q).
and the revenue of the seller is 1  q.
(ii) When q(a) < q < q(a), an optimal mechanism is:
 xi(l; l) = xi(h; h) = 12 , xi(l; h) = 0, and xi(h; l) = 1
 ti(l; l) = ti(l; h) = 121
 ti(h; h) = q+0+1+1 12
 ti(h; l) = q+0+1+12
and the revenue of the seller is 1
2
(0 + 21 + 1 + q   q2   (1  q)2) :
(iii) When q  q(a), an optimal mechanism is:
 xi(l; l) = xi(h; h) = 12 , xi(l; h) = 0, and xi(h; l) = 1




 ti(h; h) =
0
2
 ti(l; h) =
1
2
+ (0 + 1)
1  q   1   1
2(0 + 1 + 0 + 1   1)
 ti(l; l) =
1
2
  (1  0   1)
1  q   1   1
2(0 + 1 + 0 + 1   1)
and the revenue of the seller is 1
2

1  (q2 + (1  q)2   0   1)
0 + 0   q
























































































We will ignore the incentive constraint of the low type and check ex post that it is
satised. Therefore, the participation constraint of the low type must be binding.
Let Uhi be the utility of the high type in equilibrium and U
l
i be the utility of the low
type in equilibrium, that is:
U li  min
0;1
1xi(l; l) + (1  q   1)xi(l; h)  (0 + 1))ti(l; l)  (1  0   1)ti(l; h)
Uhi  min
0;1
(1  q   1)xi(h; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(h; h)  (1  0   1))ti(h; l)  (0 + 1)ti(h; h)
Note that it is optimal to set U li = 0. The incentive constraint of the high type is:
min
0;1
(1 q 1)xi(l; l)+(2q 1+1)xi(l; h)  (0+1))ti(l; h)  (1 0 1)ti(l; l)  Uhi
The participation constraint of the low type is:
min
0;1
1xi(l; l) + (1  q   1)xi(l; h)  (0 + 1))ti(l; l)  (1  0   1)ti(l; h) = 0
We can subtract the latter from the former to get:
(1  q   1   1)xi(l; l) + (3q   2 + 1 + 1)xi(l; h)  Uhi
0 + 1 + 0 + 1   1
 ti(l; h)  ti(l; l)
Dene:
tl;i  ti(l; h)  ti(l; l)
th;i  ti(h; l)  ti(h; h)
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We can write the expected transfers to the seller from each type as:
T li = min
0;1
1xi(l; l) + (1  q   1)xi(l; h) 
 
q2 + (1  q)2   (0 + 1)

tl;i
T hi = min
0;1
(1  q   1)xi(h; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(h; h) 
 









1 be solutions to these minimization problems. The seller chooses
xi(l; l) 2 [0; 12 ], xi(h; h) 2 [0;
1
2
], xi(l; h) 2 [0; 1], xi(h; l) 2 [0; 1   xi(l; h)], tl;i 2 R,
th;i 2 R, and Uhi  0 to maximize T li + T hi subject to:
(1  q   1   1)xi(l; l) + (3q   2 + 1 + 1)xi(l; h)  Uhi
0 + 1 + 0 + 1   1
 tl;i









1xi(l; l) + (1  q   1)xi(l; h) 
 





(1  q   1)(1  xi(h; l)) +
1
2
(2q   1 + 1) 
 





(1  q   1   1)xi(l; l) + (3q   2 + 1 + 1)xi(l; h)  Uhi
0 + 1 + 0 + 1   1
 tl;i
0  xi(l; l) 
1
2
0  xi(l; h)  1
Dene:
tl;i(xi(l; l); xi(l; h); U
h
i )  max

0;
(1  q   1   1)xi(l; l) + (3q   2 + 1 + 1)xi(l; h)  Uhi
0 + 1 + 0 + 1   1
;
xi(l; h)  xi(l; l)

We show that tl;i = tl;i(xi(l; l); xi(l; h); U
h
i ) is optimal. Note that tl;i < 0 implies
l0 = 0, which implies that q
2 + (1   q)2   l0   l1 < 0, so it is protable to increase
tl;i (which also slackens ICh). Similarly when tl;i < xi(l; h)   xi(l; l), l1 = 1, which
implies that q2 + (1   q)2   l0   l1 < 0, so it is protable to increase tl;i. If tl;i >













Similarly, it is optimal to set th;i = th;i(xi(l; h)). Thus, the problem becomes:
max
xi(l;l);xi(l;h);Uhi
R(xi(l; l); xi(l; h); U
h
i ) = min
1

1xi(l; l) + (1  q   1)xi(l; h)
 
 
q2 + (1  q)2   (0 + 1)








(1  q   1)(1  xi(l; h)) +






















1 > 0 xi(l; h) < xi(l; l) <
 xi(l;h)(3q 2+1+1)+Uhi
1 q 1 1
q2 + (1  q)2   0 > 0
 xi(l;h)(3q 1 0 0)+Uhi
0+0 q




















+ (1  q   1)xi(l; h)
 
 









(1  q   1)(1  xi(l; h)) +








































< xi(l; h) <
1
2





















(1  q   1   1) < Uhi < 12(2q   1)
1
2
Uhi  12(2q   1)
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+ (1  q   1)xi (l; h)(Uhi ) 
 





+ (1  q   1)(1  xi (l; h)(Uhi )) +




q2 + (1  q)2   (0 + 1)

th;i(x












(1  q   1   1) < Uhi < 12(2q   1)




0 q2 + (1  q)2   0   1  0 + 0 + 1 + 1   1
1
2
(1  q   1   1) 0 + 0 + 1 + 1   1 < q2 + (1  q)2   0   1 < 3q   2 + 1 + 1
1
2
(2q   1) q2 + (1  q)2   0   1  3q   2 + 1 + 1
This is equivalent to:
Uh =
8>>><>>>:
0 q  q(a)
1
2
(1  q   1   1) q(a) < q < q(a)
1
2
(2q   1) q  q(a)
Thus, in the optimal symmetric mechanism, xi(l; l) = xi(h; h) = 12 , and:
xi(l; h) =
8>>><>>>:
0 q  q(a)
1
2









0 q(a) < q < q(a)








q(a) < q < q(a)
0 q  q(a)
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To recover the transfers ti(l; l), ti(l; h), ti(h; l), and ti(h; h), use:
min
0;1




(1  q   1)xi(h; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(h; h)
  (1  0   1))(ti(h; h) + th;i)  (0 + 1)ti(h; h)

= Uhi
Now we show that the optimal symmetric mechanism is fully optimal. Suppose that
there exists an asymmetric mechanism (x; t) that is optimal. Dene:












Consider the following symmetric mechanism:
x0i(; ) = x(; )
t0i(l; ) = t(l; ) + min
0;1

1x(l; l) + (1  q   1)x(l; h)







t0i(h; ) = t(h; ) + min
0;1

(1  q   1)x(h; l) + (2q   1 + 1)x(h; h)


















i in equilibrium; therefore both participation constraints are satised.
Dene xl  x(l; h)   x(l; l), tl  t(l; h)   t(l; l), xl;i  xi(l; h)   xi(l; l), and
tl;i  ti(l; h)  ti(l; l). To see that ICh is satised, rst note that:
min
0;1








(1  q   1)xi(l; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(l; h)  (1  0   1)ti(l; l)  (0 + 1)ti(l; h)
+ min
0;1








































(1  q   1)xi(l; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(l; h)  (1  0   1)ti(l; l)  (0 + 1)ti(l; h)
+ min
0;1



































(1  q   1)xi(l; l) + (2q   1 + 1)xi(l; h)  (1  0   1)ti(l; l)  (0 + 1)ti(l; h)
+ min
0;1















 1xl;i + (0 + 1)tl;i   min
0;1






The last inequality follows because:
min
0;1















 1xl;i + (0 + 1)tl;i   min
0;1
 1xl + (0 + 1)tl
= min
0;1







1xl;i   (0 + 1)tl;i
+max
0;1







1xl;i   (0 + 1)tl;i





(1 + 1)xl;i   (0 + 0 + 1 + 1)tl;i = 0
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The proof that ICl is satised is analogous. Dene xh  x(h; l)   x(h; h), th 
t(h; l)  t(h; h), xh;i  xi(h; l)  xi(h; h), and th;i  ti(h; l)  ti(h; h). Then:
min
0;1




















1xi(h; l) + (1  q   1)xi(h; h)  (0 + 1)ti(h; l)  (1  0   1)ti(h; h)
+ min
0;1






































1xi(h; l) + (1  q   1)xi(h; h)  (0 + 1)ti(h; l)  (1  0   1)ti(h; h)
+ min
0;1















 1xh;i + (0 + 1)th;i   min
0;1

























i(h; h)  t(h; h), so the symmetric mechanism (x0; t0) is incentive
compatible and yields weakly greater revenue to the seller than (x; t).
8.3 Proofs for Section 5
8.3.1 Many bidders
Each of n bidders has a common valuation v 2 f0; 1g for an object; where Pr(v = 0) = 1
2
:




With probability v; all bidders receive the signal s in state v: that is, with probability
v each bidders signal is si = s: Otherwise each bidders signal is drawn independently
from the same distribution as the public signal so that Pr(si = hjv = 1) = Pr(si = ljv =
0) = q > 1
2
: The bidders consider as possible the following values of v:
0  0  a
0  1  a
Let 0 = 1  a. Dene P (k l; n   k   1 hjh; (0; 1)) as the probability of k l signals
(ordered), and n  k   1 h signals, conditional on an h signal under beliefs (0; 1), and
let E(0;1)[vjk l; n  k h] be the corresponding conditional expectation. That is:
P (k l; n  k   1 hjh; (0; 1)) = (1  q)((1  0)qk(1  q)n k 1 + 0I(k = 0))
+ q((1  1)qn k 1(1  q)k + 1I(k = 0))
and E(0;1)[vjk l; n  k h] =
q((1 1)qn k 1(1 q)k+1I(k=0))
(1 q)((1 0)qk(1 q)n k 1+0I(k=0))+q((1 1)qn k 1(1 q)k+1I(k=0))
Proposition 6A:When ambiguity is not too large, there exists a symmetric equilibrium
of the rst price auction where for su¢ ciently large n:
 The low type has beliefs (0; 1) = (a0; 0) and bids ba(l) = E(0;0)[vjl; : : : ; l].
 The high type has beliefs (0; 1) = (0; a) and mixes on the support [ba(l); bF ]








P (k l; n k 1 hjh; (0; a))E(0;1)[vjk l; n k h]+P (n 1 ljh; (0; a))ba(l)







P (k l; n  k   1 hjh; (0; a))(E(0;1)[vjk l; n  k h]  b)F (b)n k 1
= P (n  1 ljh; (0; a))(b  ba(l))
Proof. Note that Pr(l; : : : ; ljl) = (1  q)(1+(1 1)(1  q)n 1)+ q(0+(1 0)qn 1);
and E(vjl; : : : ; l) = (1 q)(1+(1 1)(1 q)
n 1)
(1 q)(1+(1 1)(1 q)n 1)+q(0+(1 0)qn 1) : Thus, the equilibrium utility of
the low type is:
min
0;1
(1  q)(1 + (1  1)(1  q)n 1)(1  b)  q(0 + (1  0)qn 1)b
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Note that the derivative with respect to 0 is  q(1   qn 1) < 0 and the derivative with
respect to 1 is (1   q)(1   (1   q)n 1) > 0: Thus, in equilibrium, the low types beliefs
are given by (0; 1) = (0; 0): Under the equilibrium bid, the low type gets zero utility.
Note that any bid below ba(l) yields zero utility, and any bid above ba(l) yields negative
utility under the equilibrium beliefs (for su¢ ciently small a). Therefore any deviation is
also not protable evaluated under the utility minimising beliefs.The equilibrium utility











P (k l; n  k   1 hjh; (0; 1))
"




























































In Lemma 6A below we show that the above derivative is positive. The derivative of











@P (k l; n  k   1 hjh; (0; 1))E(0;1)[vjk l; n  k h]
@1






































































Note that by Lemma 6A this derivative is negative.
Note now that F is increasing, F (ba(l)) = 0, and F (bF ) = 1. Moreover, ba(l) <
E[vjn   1 l; h; (0; 1)] (which is true when ambiguity is not too large) ensures that the
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utility of high type is greater than 0. Any bid below ba(l) gives zero utility, and any
bid above bF gives strictly lower utility than bidding bF . By construction, under beliefs
(0; 1) = (0; 1), any bid in the support [ba(l); bF ] gives the same utility, and any other
mixed strategy can give at most this utility.
























Proof of Lemma 6A: Below we will focus just on some of the expressions in the sum
















Proof: Assume that a is very small and consider the equation for the high type to be







P (k l; n  k   1 hjh; (0; 1))(E(0;1)[vjk l; n  k h]  b)F (b)n k 1
= P (n  1 ljh; (0; a))(b  ba(l)),








P (k l; n  k   1 hjh; (0; a))(E(0;1)[vjk l; n  k h]  b)F (b)n k 1
= P (n  1 ljh; (0; a))(b  ba(l))
Fact: For any b < bF ; either F (b)n ! 0 or F (b)n ! (b) < 1:
Proof: Suppose that for some b; bF > b > ba(l); F (b)n ! (b) > 0: Note that as n grows
large, by the law of large numbers, the LHS of (*) converges to
qa(1  b)(b) + q(1  a)(1  b)((b))q   (1  q)b((b))1 q
while the RHS converges to zero. Therefore, (*) implies
1((b))





As bF = E[V jh] = q; if b < bF the solution will be (b) < 1:
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is increasing in b and reaches its maximum for b = bF where the expression is equal 1.

































as n grows large.





is bounded from zero, therefore the second
term is the same magnitude as 1
n
:




































nq(1 q) : For any n take a sequence n1 such that
n1
n
! 0 and n1p
n
! 1: Consider






































zero we are done.
Proposition 6B: In the equilibrium described in Proposition 6A, the sellers revenue
is decreasing in a.
Proof. To make clear that the equilibrium strategy depends on n and a, denote the
bidding strategy for the high type by F (b;n; a). As in the proof of Lemma 6A, consider
the equation dening F (b;n; a):








P (k l; n  k   1 hjh; (0; 1))(E(0;1(a))[vjk l; n  k h]  b)F (b;n; a)n k 1
= P (n  1 ljh; (0; 1))(b  ba(l))
By the law of large numbers, for large n, the LHS is close to:
q1(1  b)F (b;n; a)n 1 + q(1  1)(1  b)F (b;n; a)q(n 1)   (1  q)bF (b;n; a)(1 q)(n 1)
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and the RHS is close to 0. Thus, F (b;n; a) is close to F (b;n; a), where for b 2 [0; q],
F (b;n; a) is the unique positive solution to:
q1(1  b)F (b;n; a)n 1 + q(1  1)(1  b)F (b;n; a)q(n 1)   (1  q)bF (b;n; a)(1 q)(n 1) = 0




bdF (b;n; a) is close to
R q
0
bdF (b;n; a). Take a0 > a; since F (b;n; a) rst order
stochastically dominates F (b;n; a0),
R q
0
bdF (b;n; a0) <
R q
0




bdF (b;n; a0) <
R bF
ba(l)
bdF (b;n; a). Thus, the expected payment of the high
type is decreasing in a. Since the expected payment of the low type is E(0(a);0)[vjl; : : : ; l]
which is decreasing in a, this implies that the sellers revenue is decreasing in a.
8.3.2 Continuous signals
Here we consider a general set of marginal distributions, gv(s): Specically assume that
g1 is increasing and g0 is decreasing, and assume symmetry so that g1(s) = g0(1  s):
Let us rst write the utility of a player per each bid b: This is










where b(s0) is the bid used by the other player and z = b 1(b). Thus per each bid b;
each player minimizes his utility by choosing a vector ; given the strategy of the other
player. Recall that sv, for v 2 f0; 1g; is the median of the cdf Gv():
Lemma A1: Consider an equilibrium in which b(s) is increasing. Let v(s) denote
the information structure which minimizes the utility of the player for each s. Then:
(i) (0; 

1) = (max; min) for all s < s0:
(ii) (0; 

1) = (min; min) for all s 2 [s0;minfŝ; s1g]:
(iii) (0; 





1) = (max; max) for all s > maxfs1; ŝg;




0)  1))ds0 = 0:
That is, (s) changes with s; so the behaviour as described cannot be rationalized
with a unique a priori :
Proofs of Lemma A1 and Proposition 7: We rst show in Claims 1-3 how players
choose  to minimize their utility given each s; when the bid of the other player is
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weakly increasing in s0: We then show that the bidding function described above, for the












Claim 1: In equilibrium, v = min (max) i¤ Iv(s) > (<)0:
Iv(s) is the derivative of the expected utility with respect to v: Given max-min behav-
iour, the statement follows.
Claim 2: (i) I1(s) > 0 for s < s1; I1(s) < 0 for all s > s1; (ii) I0(s) < 0 for s < s0;
I0(s) > 0 for all s 2 (s0; ŝ); I0(s) < 0 for all s > ŝ:
Proof of Claim 2:
(i) I1(s) : This function must be strictly positive for s < s1 as (2G1(s) 1)(2G1(s0) 1) >






























2)(1  b(s))(2G1(s)  1)(2G1(s)  1))
So whenever I1(s) > 0 and s > s1 we have that
@I1(s)
@s
> 0 as g1(s) is increasing
and 2(g1(s))2)(1   b(s))(2G1(s)   1)(2G1(s)   1)) > 0. So now it su¢ ces to check that






















(1  b(s1))g1(s0)(2G1(s0)  1)ds0 = 0;
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where the last inequality follows as b(s0) is increasing, (2G1(s0)  1) > 0 (< 0) whenever





0)  1)ds0 = 0:
(ii) I0(s) : This function must be strictly negative for s < s0 as (2G0(s)  1)(2G0(s0) 


















0)  1)ds0 > 0





0) 1))ds0 is decreasing for s > s0.
























0)  1)ds0 = 0:




0)  1))ds0 = 0;
and we can conclude that I0(s) > 0 for s 2 (s0; ŝ) and that I0(s) < 0 for s > ŝ:
Consider now the bidding function E

(vjs; s): Note that overbidding, compared to the
canonical model, arises when
[1 + 1(2G1(s)  1)2]g21(s)






which holds if an only if:
[1 + 1(2G1(s
0)  1)2]
[1 + 0(2G0(s0)  1)2]
> 1:
We then have:
Claim 3: When b(s) = E

(vjs; s); a necessary condition for overbidding compared to




0)  1)ds0 < 0
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If this holds, there is overbidding in the region [s0; ŝ], and underbidding for any other
s. Otherwise, all types underbid compared to the canonical model.
Proof of Claim 3: Given Claims 1 and 2, we can then deduce the di¤erent values
of v in equilibrium and consider when overbidding/underbidding arises compared to the
canonical model when the bidding function is as described in the Proposition.




[1 + max(2G0(s0)  1)2]
< 1;
which is indeed the case as min < 0 < max:
b. (0; 1) = (min; min) for all s 2 [s0;minfŝ; s1g]: We have underbidding i¤:
[1 + min(2G1(s
0)  1)2]
[1 + min(2G0(s0)  1)2]
< 1
If minfŝ; s1g > 0:5; then we would have overbidding because in the region above 0.5, as
(2G1(0:5) 1)2 = (2G0(0:5) 1)2 by symmetry, but because of convexity (concavity) of G1
(G0), the fraction would be greater than 1, as we would have (2G1(s0) 1)2 < (2G0(s0) 1)2
just above 0.5.
c. (0; 1) = (max; max) for all s > maxfs1; ŝg: In this case we also have underbidding
as [1 + max(2G1(s0)  1)2] < [1 + max(2G0(s0)  1)2], because 12 < G1(s
0) < G0(s
0):




[1 + min(2G0(s0)  1)2]
> 1
For this we need s1 < ŝ; implying that 0:5 < ŝ:
e. if ŝ < s1 : Then we have (0; 1) = (max; min) in this region between the two values.
Then we have underbidding as:
[1 + min(2G1(s
0)  1)2]
[1 + max(2G0(s0)  1)2]
< 1:

























which is analogous to what is in the Proposition. Finally we need to show that the
construction above is an equilibrium:
Claim 4: The bidding function b(s0) dened above with the values of (s) described
above consists a symmetric equilibrium when a is low enough.
Proof of Claim 4: We now show that given the above it is optimal, wlog, for player
1 to choose b(s) at s; when player 2 uses b(s0) and (s) as dened above.











((1  b(s0))f1(̂;s; s0)  b(s0)f0(̂;s; s0))ds0
This is not player 1s utility as it is evaluated at ̂ for all s0: However note that when




(1  b(s))f1(̂;s; s) = b(s)f0(̂;s; s)
i¤
[1 + 0(2G0(s)  1)2]g20(s)[1 + 1(2G1(s)  1)(2G1(s)  1)]g1(s)g1(s)
= [1 + 1(2G1(s)  1)2]g21(s)[1 + 0(2G0(s)  1)(2G0(s)  1)]g0(s)g0(s)
which holds.
Moreover as we now show the rst order condition w.r.t. s0 is zero, the second order
condition evaluated at this point is negative, thus z = s is a maximum: To see this,
suppose that we have a z for which Û(s; z) = 0: Taking a second derivative w.r.t. z we
get:  b0(z)(f1(̂;s; z) + f0(̂;s; z)) + (1  b(z))f 01(̂;s; z)  b(z)f 00(̂;s; z): As Û(s; z) = 0;
this implies that (1  b(z)) = b(z)f0(̂;s;z)
f1(̂;s;z)
; and thus the second order derivative at that z is
 b0(z)(f1(̂;s; z) + f0(̂;s; z)) +
b(z)f0(̂;s; z)
f1(̂;s; z)
f 01(̂;s; z)  b(z)f 00(̂;s; z)
=  b0(z)(f1(̂;s; z) + f0(̂;s; z)) + b(z)(
f0(̂;s; z)
f1(̂;s; z)
f 01(̂;s; z)  f 00(̂;s; z))





Note that when ̂ is small enough, this is always the case as the LHS is negative. Thus
a solution to the rst order condition is unique.
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But the above implies that player 1 can achieve this utility above and cannot improve
upon it when using other bids z 6= s:
So we know that the player bids until the integrand gets negative, so, written di¤erently,
until E̂(s)(vjs; s) = b(s); which gives us the equilibrium bidding function.
We now consider the sellers revenue and show they decrease in a; under the su¢ cient
condition identied. Consider the case when ŝ > s1: Let
w(s0) = (1 G1(s0))g1(s0) + (1 G0(s0))g0(s0)


















































b(s0; max; min)ja=1 =
g1(s
0)2g0(s




b(s0; min; min)ja=1 =
g1(s
0)2g0(s





















b(s0; max; min)ja=1 =  
@
@a
b(s0; min; max)ja=1 =  
@
@a
b(1  s0; min; max)ja=1
@
@a
b(s0; max; max)ja=1 =  
@
@a
b(s0; min; min)ja=1 =
@
@a
b(1  s0; min; min)ja=1
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Thus, a su¢ cient condition for revenue to be decreasing in a is w(s0) decreasing over
[ŝ; 1  ŝ]:
Private values: Consider the following model where each buyer has private valuation
vi 2 [0; 1], independently distributed according to a uniform distribution. Suppose that
the buyers believe that the joint distribution is given by the F-G-M copula f(vi; vj;) =




(1 + (2vi   1)(2vj   1))dvj = z + z(z   1)(2vi   1)
That is, G(jvi) is the distribution of vj conditional on vi, when the belief about the





















yd(L(yj0:5)  L(yj0:5)) vi > 0:5
Bids in the rst price auction are uniformly higher than the case without ambiguity.
Proof of Proposition 8A: Assume that player j is following the equilibrium strategy.
Player is utility from bidding b(z) 2 [0; vi] is:
min
2
U(zjvi)  G(zjvi)(vi   b(z))
Note that G(zjvi) = z + z(z   1)(2vi   1). Thus,  minimizes this utility for types
vi  0:5, and  minimizes this utility for types vi > 0:5. Thus, the utility from bidding
b(z) is U(zjvi) for vi  0:5 and U(zjvi) for vi > 0:5. First order conditions imply:
g(vijvi)(vi   b(vi)) G(vijvi)b0(vi) = 0 vi  0:5
g(vijvi)(vi   b(vi)) G(vijvi)b0(vi) = 0 vi > 0:5
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Using boundary conditions b(0) = 0 and b(0:5) =
R 0:5
0











yd(L(yj0:5)  L(yj0:5)) vi > 0:5













(z   b(z))  b0(z)

= 0
































(z   b(z))  b0(z)

= 0








To see that bids are uniformly higher under ambiguity, note that in the case without
ambiguity, the bid can be written as b0(vi) =
R vi
0





is decreasing in  since the integrand g(tjt)
G(tjt) is decreasing in .
25 Thus, L rst order














23The argument for v > 0:5 is analogous.
24The derivative of g(zjv)G(zjv) with respect to v is
2z2
G(zjv)2 .
25The derivative of g(tjt)G(tjt) with respect to  is
t2(2t 1)
G(tjt)2 .






= 0:5(L0(0:5jvi)  L(0:5jvi)) +
Z vi
0:5
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